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ABSTRACT 
It can be hard to see where money fits in the world. Money seems both real and imaginary, since it has 
obvious causal powers, but is also, just as obviously, something humans have just made up. Recent 
philosophical accounts of money have declared it to be real, but for very different reasons. John Searle and 
Francesco Guala disagree over whether money is just whatever acts like money, or just whatever people 
believe to be money. In developing their accounts of institutions as a part of social reality, each uses money 
as a paradigm institution, but they disagree on how institutions exist. Searle argues that the institution of 
money belongs to an ontological level separate from the physical world, held up by the collective intentions 
of a group, while Guala claims that money is a part of the ordinary physical world and is just whatever 
performs a “money-like function” in a group, regardless of what that group believes about it. Here, we 
argue that any purely functional account like Guala’s will be unable to capture the distinctive phenomenon 
of money, since monetary transactions are defined by the attitudes transactors hold toward them. Money 
will be obscured or misidentified if defined functionally. As we go on to show by examining recent work 
by Smit et al., belief in money does not require taking on all of Searle’s ontological commitments, but 
money and mental contents will stand or fall together. 
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Money and Mental Contents 
1. Introduction 
 It is hard to see where money fits in the world. Money has obvious causal powers: it can 
allow or prevent people from doing all sorts of things. But just as obviously, money is a human 
invention, something we just made up, and it is something that would disappear if we stopped 
holding up its existence. Money therefore seems to have claims on being both real and 
imaginary, both factual and fictitious. 
 This paper does not aim at settling the questions of exactly where money fits in the world 
and whether we ought to believe in it or not, but it does aim to make some progress on both of 
those questions. It argues that money is ineluctably connected to the existence of the intentional 
attitudes of creatures with minds, since monetary transactions only occur when objects are 
exchanged for the sake of their exchange value. Any attempt to show that money is part of the 
real and actual world must be able to capture this.  
Any explanations of distinctively monetary phenomena in the world that deny the 
existence of, or that are indifferent to the attitudes agents hold toward those phenomena cannot 
succeed because they exclude a crucial constitutive feature of what makes money money. 
Whether this means we ought to believe in money or not is a separate question. All we wish to 
establish here is that money and mental contents will stand or fall together, at least in one 
direction, since there can be no adequate account of money that does not allow for mental 
contents as well. 
 This mental contents constraint will have consequences for recent philosophical work on 
money. Specifically, it will exclude Francesco Guala’s recent attempts to define money in purely 
functional terms. Guala makes the claim that money is a part of the ordinary physical world and 
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is simply whatever performs a “money-like function” in a group, regardless of what that group 
believes about it. Guala’s account is a response to John Searle’s account of money as a part of 
what he calls “institutional” reality that depends on a group’s “collective intentions” toward it in 
order to exist. Roughly, Guala tells us that money is whatever acts like money, while Searle 
claims that money is whatever people believe to be money. 
 Our primary aim in this paper is to establish one necessary condition for any descriptively 
adequate account of money. We apply this condition to recent accounts of money as an 
institutional object in the literature on social ontology. In presenting this debate, we will describe 
Searle’s account of money first, so that it will be easier to see in the next section how Guala’s 
account is meant as a response to it. In section four, we draw a distinction between transactions, 
which include the reason for an exchange, and exchanges, which do not, and use this distinction 
to argue that money can only be captured in terms of distinctive transactions. Section five then 
argues that Guala’s is an account of mere exchanges, not transactions, and so cannot be an 
adequate account of money. In section six, we investigate what sort of ontological commitments 
belief in money therefore involves and argue that one need not be a Searlean in order to be a 
realist about money, as recent work by Smit, Buekens, and Du Plessis (hereafter Smit et al.) 
shows. In the seventh section, we observe that attending to the mental contents constraint makes 
two further contributions to the debate about institutional reality and social ontology. First, it 
provides a different way to configure the debate, with some authors and their critics landing on 
the same side. Second, it draws attention to an underappreciated way in which social objects 
depend on propositional attitudes for their existence. In our final section, we conclude by 
indicating what this teaches us about the reality of money and its place in the world.  
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2. Searle on Money 
According to John Searle (1995), money is an institution. For Searle, institutions are 
remarkable things because, while they are created by humans out of subjective attitudes like 
beliefs and intentions, we can still make objectively true statements about them. By 
distinguishing between the ontological and epistemological aspects of institutions, Searle is able 
to claim that institutions are ontologically subjective, because they depend on human attitudes for 
their existence, yet epistemically objective, because we can make objectively true or false claims 
about them. 
Epistemically objective statements, according to Searle (2005), are “true or false 
independently of the feelings and attitudes of the makers and interpreters of the statement.” (p. 4) 
Institutions allow for such epistemic objectivity because they are built from a group’s collective 
intentionality. Intentional attitudes are directed mental states and encompass desires, beliefs, 
intentions, etc. These attitudes occur in our minds individually, yet there can be collective 
intentionality when two or more agents intend something together, or in “we” terms. Both 
humans and many species of animals have the capacity for collective intentionality, and this 
intentionality is the basis of all social reality (Searle, 2005, p. 6). A wolf pack hunting a deer is 
operating with collective intentionality, just as two people exchanging wedding vows are 
operating with collective intentionality. The wolves intend together to hunt the deer, instead of 
being a random collection who just happen to coalesce in a simultaneous attack on it. The couple 
getting married intend together to behave toward each other in particular ways, instead of merely 
saying words in a ceremony and then hoping their individual projects will thereafter happen to 
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coincide. In each case, the parties intend to do something together, and each is an instance of 
collective intentionality thereby creating social facts (i.e. any fact involving the collective 
intentionality of two or more agents) about which epistemically objective claims can be made. 
Even if Sally is a part of the group collectively intending a social fact into existence, that social 
fact does not depend on Sally’s feelings and attitudes alone, and so she, independently of her 
individual attitudes, can make claims about those social facts that can be right or wrong, and so 
epistemically objective.  
Institutions, subsets of social facts, require collective intentionality, but unlike the case of 
social facts, this intentionality is not sufficient for creating institutions. Searle distinguishes 
institutional facts from social facts by an imposition of function. We have the capacity to impose 
functions on objects, for instance assigning a log the function of being a chair. Here, the log 
functions as a chair through a combination of an agent’s intentions and the log’s own physical 
properties – it wouldn’t be a chair if the agent hadn’t intended it to be one. But agents can 
impose functions in another way, independent of an object’s physical characteristics. This 
assignment is called a status function, a function that can only be performed because the power 
to do so is collectively assigned. Where a row of logs can perform the physical function of being 
a barrier, a line of paint on the ground would make a useless barrier unless it is granted the status 
function of a boundary that is not to be crossed. 
An institution results from collective intentionality and the assignment of a status 
function and is described as X counts as Y in context C (Searle, 2005, p. 7). The X term identifies 
a certain feature (or an object, person, state of affairs etc.); the Y term is the assignment of a 
special status to the X; the C term specifies the context in which the assignment takes place. 
Searle refers to these as constitutive rules, because they create, or constitute, the things they 
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govern. When a line of paint is assigned the status of ‘boundary,’ the boundary is simultaneously 
created and described.  
Money is a paradigm institution for Searle. Paper money is created when people 
collectively intend some piece of paper (X) to count as money (Y) in a certain social group (C). 
By so doing, they give the piece of paper the status it needs to function as a medium of 
exchange, unit of account, and store of value, which it can now do in virtue of this assignment 
alone. The word ‘money’ itself is unnecessary; rather, what matters is the publically accessible 
idea that some X counts as a unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value (Searle, 
1995, pp. 63-71). Because money operates through the assignment of a status function, it does so 
when people collectively intend for some X to be their medium of exchange, not when 
something is exchanged for the value of its physical characteristics. This does not mean that 
things with valuable physical properties cannot be exchanged as money. Searle (2005) points out 
that often institutional facts evolve out of natural ones (p. 11). Money could evolve out of 
something that was once seen as having value by virtue of its physical properties rather than by 
virtue of its assigned status. But it is only when people start to view the thing as something that 
can be used to exchange due to its collectively assigned status that we have the institution of 
money. 
 
3. Guala on Institutions 
According to Searle, money as a social kind is constructed at least partly out of the 
subjective attitudes of agents. Nevertheless, it is open to investigation by social scientists and 
others, because epistemically objective claims can be made about it. The reality described by the 
social sciences is, however, “totally unlike the reality described by physics and chemistry,” and 
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Searle insists that social scientists must understand the ontology they study before they can even 
establish their methodology, let alone predict and explain phenomena. (Searle 2005, p. 1) 
Guala disagrees both with Searle’s claims about methodology and his claim that social 
reality must be built out of collective intentionality. 
Methodologically, Guala (2015) insists that “ontology is not and can never be prior to 
science” (p.11). By denying that ontology must come first, Guala opens up social reality to 
scientific investigation beyond what Searle’s theory will allow. Social kinds have causal features 
akin to other scientific kinds, and thus we can study them and make predictions about them, 
precisely like the predictions of chemical or physical phenomena. What this means is that social 
kinds possess describable causal properties, which can be used for prediction and explanation 
without reference to any group intentions. Since collective intentionality is unnecessary to 
capture social reality, institutions should be thought to consist in the stable, predictable, and 
describable behaviour patterns of a group, rather than in its deliberate collective intentions.  
Amie Thomasson (2003) has already observed that not all social facts depend on 
collective intentionality to exist. For example, an economy can be in a recession even if no one 
in that economy intends it to be, and a society can be racist even if no member of it notices that it 
is (and would even deny the allegation that it was) (p. 606). Thomasson’s argument leaves open 
the possibility that all institutions still rest on collective intentionality, even if not all social facts 
do. Guala extends Thomasson’s argument to show it is also true that not all institutions depend 
on collective intentionality, using the racist institution of apartheid. Apartheid, argues Guala, 
“did not rest on a collective agreement or a group intention: the whole point of apartheid in fact 
was to undermine the notion that black and white people belonged to the same community.” 
(Guala 2016, p. 108) Social and institutional objects like these are able to exist independently of 
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the collective intentionality Searle insists is necessary for them, and so serve as counterexamples 
to Searle’s view. 
Since collective intentionality is unnecessary when explaining parts of social reality such 
as institutions, Guala sets out to show how an institution can be derived without it.1 Guala (2016) 
sees institutions as solutions to coordination problems, where rules are imposed that result in an 
overall outcome better than the one that would have occurred if everyone acted independently. 
This he calls a “rules-in-equilibrium” approach (p. xxv). 
Instead of using Searlean constitutive rules in the form ‘X counts as Y in C,’ Guala uses a 
rule-based game theory approach in the form ‘if X then do Y.’ In circumstances in which the best 
overall outcome does not occur through people acting unilaterally, there is a coordination 
problem. If each person acts independently, an overall worse outcome is achieved. In these 
circumstances, rules of the form ‘if X do Y’ can be imposed, and in following these rules, a 
better outcome is achieved.  
Since these rules are imposed in circumstances where the best outcome is achieved 
through people not acting unilaterally, this means there must be some sort of incentive for people 
to follow the rules. The incentives could be negative or positive. For example, in the case of 
money, a particular metal might come to be money because it has advantageous qualities such as 
portability, imperishability, divisibility and recombinability. Alternatively, the government could 
impose a tax that can only be paid for in the new currency of salt. If people do not pay their taxes 
in salt, the government will punish them. In either case, people are incentivized to use this new 
                                                             
1 In tandem with his necessity argument, Guala (2010) also argues that collective intentionality is insufficient for 
deriving institutions – if people collectively believe something is money but it fails to function as such, collective 
acceptance is insufficient to create that institution. However, since Searle never claims that collective acceptance is 
sufficient for institutions and our mental contents constraint leaves aside questions of what is sufficient for social 
objects like money, we opt not to address Guala’s sufficiency argument outside this footnote. 
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currency as money, regardless of their belief about it. Both the institution of money itself and the 
particular form of currency arise not out of a group’s deliberate collective intentions, but rather 
out of a set of pressures and incentives. Therefore, people do not need to view the new currency 
as money, they simply must use it as money (i.e. in an exchange, as a store of value, a unit of 
account). This means that for something to be considered money, the intentions of the people 
exchanging it do not matter, what matters is that it is functioning in an exchange. An outside 
observer, such as a social scientist, can determine that something is money, regardless of what 
the people using it believe about it. Since money, like all social institutions, is a pattern of 
behaviour in response to incentives, it can be predicted and described just like any other natural 
phenomenon, using the ordinary methods of science. Money and other social institutions need 
not be considered “totally unlike the reality described by physics and chemistry.” (Searle 2005, 
p. 1) 
On Guala’s (2016) account, money is not what we collectively agree to be money, it is 
instead whatever fulfills the various functions of money. It can be anything from shells to 
electronic bytes (p. 35). “The existence of money does not depend on the representation of some 
things as money, but on the existence of causal mechanisms that ensure that some entities 
perform money-like functions” (Guala 2015, p. 9). These functions include serving as a medium 
of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account. The term money is not dependent on the 
representation of some things as money, but rather is dependent on the actions associated with it, 
actions like “accept as payment” (Guala 2015, p. 10). For Guala, money is whatever acts like 
money, regardless of the reason why.  
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4. Exchanges and Transactions 
 Both Searle and Guala are only indirectly interested in money. They are instead 
concerned with institutional reality more generally and disagree primarily over the role that 
collective intentionality plays in it. For each of them, money serves as a paradigm of institutional 
reality, not an independent object of investigation. Nonetheless, we can still evaluate their 
contrasting accounts of money to see how well they describe the phenomenon of money. Doing 
so will reveal not only an important feature of money, which any adequate account of it will have 
to capture, but also a different axis of disagreement among Searle, Guala, and other authors 
working on institutional reality. To do this, we begin by considering the relationship between 
money and exchange value. 
Monetary transactions are distinctive, different from other transactions. When something 
is exchanged as money, it is given or accepted on the strength of its exchange value. When 
someone accepts a five-dollar bill as money, they accept it for its capacity to be exchanged for 
other things. When they are happy to take the five-dollar bill as payment because they know they 
can use it later to trade for other things they need or want, it is the bill’s exchange value that they 
recognize and are moved by. This is different from accepting the five-dollar bill for some other 
reason corresponding to the many other uses the bill can have. If someone instead accepts the bill 
because it makes a lovely bookmark, is just the right colour scheme to hang in their house as a 
decoration, or to use as kindling in a fire, then the transaction rests on the bill’s use value, and is 
a barter object, not a piece of money. 
 The observation that monetary transactions are about exchange value is hardly new. 
Aristotle condemned usury since “money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to 
increase at interest.” (McKeon 1941, p. 1141) He similarly condemns the practice of “retail” 
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(investing money in commodities to later sell for more money) because it treats the means of 
exchange (i.e. money) as an end. Arguably, the very telos of money on Aristotle’s analysis of it, 
is to facilitate exchange (Meikle 1994, p. 34). 
David Hume (1907) considered money as “only the instrument which men have agreed 
upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity or another…it is the oil which renders the 
motions of the wheels more smooth and easy” (p. 309). Similarly, Adam Smith claimed “money 
is the known and established instrument of commerce, for which everything is given in 
exchange” (1976, p. 438). 
 Marx put the point even more vividly, claiming that whenever a commodity functioned as 
money it “congealed” into “the only adequate form of existence of exchange-value, in opposition 
to use-value, represented by all other commodities” (Marx 1867, p. 84). Marx’s theory of the 
alienation of commodities states, “when they assume this money-shape, commodities strip off 
every trace of their natural use-value…” (1867, p. 74). In fact, according to Marx, when gold 
functions as money it becomes the “embodiment of value” and “is exchange-value itself” (Marx 
1867, p. 72). Marx even goes to the trouble of explicitly contrasting this with the use-value of 
gold which is just “the sum of the various uses of gold” (Marx 1867, p. 72). 
 Trading something as money involves a transaction that rests on exchange value, while 
trading it for its use value counts as barter. Distinguishing these two sorts of transactions in this 
way is neither controversial nor new but has important implications that can be clarified by using 
a distinction drawn from action theory. 
 Christine Korsgaard distinguishes an “act” from an “action,” by claiming that “an action 
… involves both an act and an end, an act done for the sake of an end” (Korsgaard 2009, p. 11). 
An act can be fully captured by describing what is done, while an action can only be captured by 
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describing both what is done and why it is done. This allows the same act to be part of two very 
different actions. Korsgaard’s distinction allows us to see how driving a mile south to get ice 
cream and driving a mile south to flee the scene of a hit and run are two different actions 
containing the same act. It also allows us to see how Kant need not contradict himself when he 
condemns a suicide committed to avoid future personal misery, but not a suicide performed to 
prevent harm to others when one has been bitten by a rabid dog. (Korsgaard 2009, p. 11) In both 
of these cases, the very same act forms part of two different actions, distinguishable because the 
same act is done for the sake of two different ends.  
 We can draw an analogous distinction between exchanges and transactions. Just as the 
same act might form part of different actions, the same exchange can form part of different 
transactions. As described above, the exchange of a five-dollar bill can be part of a monetary 
transaction or a barter transaction, depending on the sake for which the bill is exchanged. When 
the bill is exchanged for the sake of its exchange value, it is money, as observed by philosophers 
from Aristotle to Marx. But when the very same bill is exchanged —even between the same 
people for the same good or service—for its use value, it is not money, and is instead a barter 
object inside a barter transaction. What is crucial to notice here is that what is distinctive about 
monetary transactions, and what distinguishes those transactions from barter and all other sorts 
of exchange, are the reasons or motives of the agents involved in those transactions.2 In short, a 
                                                             
2 Objects can have both use value and exchange value simultaneously and agents can appreciate both kinds of value 
simultaneously, so there is no reason to suppose that a single transaction could not be done for the sake of both use 
and exchange value at the same time. For example, one might buy a painting both because it is beautiful and as an 
investment. It is an interesting further question whether such a transaction counts as money, barter, both, or neither. 
As we have seen above, Marx would not classify this transaction as a monetary one, because he says money strips 
off “every trace of … use value…” (Marx 1867, p. 74) But, for purposes of this paper, we take no position on 
precisely how much a transaction must be done for the sake of exchange value to count as money, since our claim is 
only that a transaction cannot be a monetary one unless it is at least partially about exchange value. How much it 
must be about exchange value is an interesting, but separate, question. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help 
in clarifying this point.) 
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necessary part of what makes something a monetary transaction are the details of the mental 
contents of the agents engaged in the transaction. In order for an exchange to count as money 
inside a distinctively monetary transaction, agents must have not only intentional content about 
it, but intentional content of a distinctive sort. Perhaps this intentional content can be 
dispositional or subconscious, not readily coming to mind or easily articulated by the agents who 
have it, but it must be about the object’s exchange value, or done for the “sake” of its exchange 
value, as Korsgaard would put it, if the exchange is to count as a monetary transaction.  
Being about exchange value may not be sufficient to make a transaction a monetary one. 
Other distinctive features of money might still be identified and argued for as additionally 
necessary for an adequate account of money, but we restrict ourselves here to arguing only for 
this mental constraint on accounts of money. As we will show in the following section, the 
mental contents constraint will exclude Guala’s recent attempt to capture money in purely 
functional terms. This does not, however, mean that we must commit all accounts of money to 
Searlean collective intentionality, as we demonstrate in section six. Then, in section seven, we 
show that when considering social objects subject to a mental contents constraint, two new 
aspects of the debate become clear: the first is the way that authors on opposite sides of the 
debate over collective intentionality can still be on the same side of the mental contents 
constraint, and the second is an important and different way in which a social object can depend 
on an attitude with a particular content. 
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5. Against Functionalism about Money 
Since monetary transactions are just those exchanges made for the sake of exchange 
value, we will be unable to capture or distinguish them if we cannot identify the sake for which 
some agent agrees to an exchange.  
This is where a purely functional account of money like Guala’s will fall short. Guala’s 
understanding of the institution of money explicitly “does not depend on the representation of 
some things as money, but on the existence of causal mechanisms that ensure that some entities 
perform money-like functions” (Guala 2015, p. 9). This will mean that it will classify anything 
performing a “money-like function” as money, whether it is performed for the sake of the 
object’s exchange value or not, and so it will mistakenly identify as money cases of sufficiently 
sophisticated barter and any other externally indistinguishable pattern of exchange regardless of 
the intentional content of the agents involved. 
Consider three cases. 
In the first, a group uses gold to perform a “money-like function,” exchanging it for 
goods and services in a familiar way. For this case, let us stipulate that the gold is money, 
because all the agents involved in exchanging it do so for its exchange value. If asked, they 
would honestly respond that what’s good about the gold how well it works as a medium of 
exchange: everyone recognizes that the gold is valuable because it can be traded for whatever 
else one might want. 
In the second case, let all the behaviours of the group remain constant, but change the 
reason for these exchanges to now rest on the use value of gold. In this case, when the agents are 
asked why they are so happy to exchange gold, they would honestly reply “Who doesn’t like 
gold? It’s shiny, it makes lovely jewelry and fountain pen nibs; why, you can even fix your teeth 
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with it! Who wouldn’t be happy to get some gold?” In this case, even though the nature of the 
exchanges has not changed, the nature of the transactions has. Since these exchanges are all 
done for the sake of the use value of the gold, they are instances of barter, and the gold that 
changes hands is a barter object, not money. 
Finally, consider a case identical to the two above in terms of the externally observable 
behaviour, but stipulate that all the behaviour is performed for reasons having nothing to do with 
either the use or exchange value of the gold. When these agents are asked, they would reply 
“This gold is a gift from the gods to bring us good luck. To receive some gold from someone is a 
great honor, and politeness demands anyone receiving some gold express their gratitude with a 
gift of some valuable good or service. The more gold received, the greater the honor, and so the 
greater the gift such politeness demands.”3    
But because all three cases involve gold performing a “money-like function,” Guala’s 
account will classify them all as instances of the institution of money. This is the danger in 
advancing a purely functionalist account of money, one that “does not depend on the 
representation of some things as money,” as Guala does. (Guala 2015, p. 9) It will classify 
anything that acts like money as a full monetary transaction. But this, we argue, is a mistake, 
since monetary transactions are transactions of a distinctive kind, done for the sake of the 
exchange value of the object exchanged. Any purported account of money indifferent to the sake 
for which an exchange occurs will be unable to properly capture distinctively monetary 
phenomena, and risks misclassifying, as Guala’s account will, cases of barter, religious practice, 
                                                             
3 Though it is hard to see what larger function such a group would have and what coordination problem it would 
solve, we could also imagine an externally identical pattern of exchanges performed by mindless automata that have 
no mental contents at all. Here, it is not even clear that these exchanges can be classified as any sort of transaction at 
all, because the beings doing the exchanging have no “sake” for which they exchange. In Korsgaard’s terms, these 
beings merely “act,” performing no “actions” at all. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for help clarifying this point.) 
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superstition, or exchanges done with any other motivation as genuine monetary phenomena 
instead.4 
 
6. Money and Ontological Commitments 
 By insisting that monetary transactions are about exchange value, and that any proper 
account of money must therefore include some account of the attitudes or other specific mental 
contents of the agents involved in them, we might seem to be encouraging some readers to 
abandon the phenomenon of money altogether. By rejecting Guala’s account of money that is 
designed to make it a part of the ordinary world of scientific investigation, we might be 
understood to be claiming that belief in money involves a commitment to an additional 
ontological level that is “totally unlike the reality described by physics and chemistry.” If that is 
so, we might be better off disposing of money altogether. If belief in money requires further 
belief in collective intentions and all the other apparatus Searle invokes to explain social reality, 
some physicalists and minimalists might conclude that that is simply too high a price to pay, that 
we must instead deny money as a distinctive phenomenon, and settle for a world that contains 
exchanges, but no transactions. 
 While we do claim that money and mental contents must stand or fall together, we do not 
take any position in this paper concerning what the proper account of these mental contents must 
be, other than to insist that they be capable of capturing monetary transactions as being about 
exchange value. Whether this is to be done with attitudes, dispositions, or whatever else and 
                                                             
4 Because Guala’s account is indifferent to the sakes for which exchanges occur, it is also incapable of giving a 
proper account of barter, since barter transactions are those that occur for the sake of the use value of the objects 
involved. An account indifferent to all reasons for which agents might transact or represent those transactions to 
themselves will be unable to capture both money and barter. 
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whether such things are ultimately physical or irreducibly mental are both questions beyond the 
scope of this paper. This is why we have chosen the more encompassing term ‘mental contents,’ 
rather than committing to a specific position about beliefs, desires, reasons, attitudes, 
dispositions, and so on. Our goal here is to establish that anyone wishing to give an adequate 
account of money must be able to capture what monetary transactions are distinctively about, not 
to evaluate the various attempts that might be made to respectably explain that aboutness. As far 
as this paper goes, we do not even insist that readers must include money in their ontology, 
whatever the other considerations might be. However, if someone does accept money into their 
ontology, they need not accept all of Searle’s claims in order to capture what money is about. 
Fortunately for us, we need not gesture at the mere possibility of accounting for the aboutness of 
monetary transactions in a non-Searlean way, since recent philosophical work on money gives us 
a detailed account of what one such possibility might look like. 
 Across a series of recent papers, Smit et al. advocate an account of money similar to 
Searle’s, but capable of ontologically reducing collective intentions into nothing more than 
incentives, which themselves are reducible to nothing more than beliefs and desires (Smit et al. 
2011, p. 4). One’s own specific ontological commitments will determine whether this reduction 
is enough to make Smit et al.’s account of money acceptable, but for our purposes it is 
illuminating because it shows in detail how the mental contents constraint can be met without 
taking on all of Searle’s own ontological commitments. When the debate is considered in light of 
the mental contents constraint rather than in terms of collective intentionality, we find Searle and 
Smit et al. on the same side. While their accounts differ precisely on the necessity of collective 
intentionality for institutional reality, they both provide accounts of money that capture the way 
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it rests on a distinctive kind of attitude, namely the way monetary transactions must be done for 
the sake of exchange value. 
According to Searle’s theory, money, and all other institutions will not only be 
irreducibly subjective, they will involve commitment to another ontological primitive in the 
subjective world: collective intentionality. While they do not object to all subjective things, Smit 
et al. reject collective intentions as ontological primitives, and work to show how they are not 
irreducible after all. They ask “is the Searlean apparatus of collective intentionality leading to 
irreducibly institutional facts at all necessary for understanding things like money, borders, etc.?” 
(2011, p. 3). They seek to show it is not necessary by explaining institutional facts using actions 
and incentives, rather than collective intentions and status functions. They change Searle’s 
formulation of “X counts as Y in C,” to “S is incentivized to act in manner Z towards X.” If they 
can derive the same institutions from incentives and action, then they show Searle’s purported 
primitive to be reducible after all. 
Smit et al. claim that agents can act so as to incentivize others to act in given ways. 
Through punishments and rewards, or threats and promises of the same, agents can provide 
incentives to other agents to act in particular ways (Smit et al. 2011, p. 13-14). Sometimes, when 
the incentivization is stable enough, a social fact results (Smit et al. 2011, p. 8). “The difference 
between a single case of being incentivized in a certain way, and a situation where the 
incentivization is strong enough, widespread and durable enough to amount to an institutional 
fact, is a mere statistical difference” (Smit et al. 2011, p. 10). Where Searle sees a difference in 
kind between collective intentions and mere collections of individual intentions, Smit et al. see a 
only a difference of degree. A social fact or institution is nothing more than a set of individual 
intentions that has stabilized into a recognizable shape. Some ontologically subjective things are 
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required to do this, like intentions (which themselves are just beliefs and desires) but explaining 
institutions, according to Smit et al., requires nothing more than that. 
Some things, like houses and hamburgers, provide incentives by virtue of their physical 
properties. The way they are physically constituted is closely linked to our reason for acting. We 
have a reason to eat a hamburger because it offers nourishment. Other things, like institutions, 
also involve a close link between reason and action, but not because of their physical nature. For 
institutions the “full incentivization needs to be brought about by some human action, or moral 
belief, that serves to incentivize us” (Smit et al, 2016, p. 1816). In both cases we have a reason, 
but one comes from the physical properties of an object and the other comes from agents creating 
incentives (p. 1816). People can be incentivized by others to act in a certain way, and when such 
incentivization is stable enough, the resulting pattern is a ‘social fact’ (Smit et al, 2011, p.8). An 
institutional object is simply a natural object individuated by these actions and incentives, an “X 
that S is incentivized to act in manner Z towards” (Smit et al. 2011, p.7) As long as people can 
attach incentives to natural objects, institutional objects can exist (Smit et al, 2016, p. 1816). 
One such incentive, could, of course, be a group of people coming together and 
deliberately assigning a status to some thing, in a way that Searle would describe as collective 
intentionality assigning something a status function. Smit et al. do not set out to deny that people 
can intend together and thereby give one another reasons to act, only that such collective 
intentions are necessary for institutions or social facts, or that such collective intentions are 
ontologically primitive, irreducible to something more familiar (Smit et al. 2014, p. 1826).  
How does money work on the incentivized view? People must be incentivized to begin 
using something as money. The source of the incentives does not matter, just that the appropriate 
incentives have been created (Smit et al. 2011, p. 14). For example, one person could start to use 
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mackerel tins as the new currency. They might start collecting them because they are so durable, 
which could lead them to “acquire them with the intention of exchanging rather than consuming 
them.” Eventually, other people begin to do the same. At some point, this behavior is so 
widespread that the mackerel tins become money, but “the tins of mackerel ‘being money’ is no 
more than the sediment of a simple practice that has stabilized” (Smit et al. 2014, p. 1827).  
At this point, it might be unclear how Smit et al.’s account of money, specifically, could 
be considered an improvement over either Searle’s or Guala’s. It is built out of ontologically 
subjective elements, such as incentives, beliefs, and desires, and declares itself to be explicitly 
uninterested in how these incentives come about, caring only that they do. This would seem to be 
taking on nearly all of Searle’s ontological commitments, as well as Guala’s indifference to 
content, thereby taking on the drawbacks of each view and the virtues of neither. 
This appearance is misleading. Smit et al.’s account of money does indeed commit itself 
to beliefs and desires, which Searle would classify as irreducibly ontologically subjective, but 
neither they nor we must join Searle in his commitment to the irreducibility of subjective entities 
like beliefs and desires. The point of their project is to show that, even in the set of entities Searle 
classifies as irreducibly subjective, some purported primitives can be reduced to other entities. 
Smit et al. readily admit that actions and incentives are mind-dependent, but only as far as they 
require beings with minds to exist. Whether or not subjective entities are reducible to objective 
entities, Smit et al. work to show that even among the subjective entities, there are workable 
accounts of money that are more ontologically austere than Searle claims are possible. 
Furthermore, their reliance on incentives, beliefs, and desires allows their building blocks 
to accommodate the mental contents condition we argue is necessary for an adequate account of 
money. As we have claimed, monetary transactions must be about exchange value in order to 
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truly count as monetary, and while Smit et al. are indifferent as to how the relevant incentives 
create the institution of money, they are always careful to specify that these incentives must be 
about exchange. 
For example, they describe money as “an object that we are incentivized to acquire for 
exchange, rather than for direct consumption” (Smit et al. 2014, p. 1818, emphasis added). They 
(2016) tell us that “as soon as a commodity is adopted as ‘money’, a group of people who 
previously had no reason to acquire it suddenly have a reason to acquire it,” because those who 
had no use for it before can now use it to exchange for things they can use (p. 343). Their most 
recent paper gives a definition of money which is complex, yet still fundamentally about 
exchange value. According to them, money is something that is “typically acquired in order to 
realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of such agents coordinating on 
acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange” (p. 331).  
By explaining money in terms of incentives that can accommodate the content monetary 
transactions must have, Smit et al. provide an account of money that can successfully meet the 
mental contents constraint, while also appealing to fewer ontological primitives than Searle’s 
account does. It therefore meets our condition for adequacy and fulfils their goal of providing an 
account involving fewer ontological primitives than Searle’s. 
 
7. Social Objects, Collective Intentions, and Propositional Attitudes 
The debate in the literature is generally organized around the question of collective 
intentionality. Searle is on one side, while all those who deny the necessity of collective 
intentionality are on the other. This division has acted as a distraction from other important 
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factors in the debate.5 While Searle and Smit et al. differ on the importance of collective 
intentionality for institutional reality, they both provide accounts of money in which money is 
about exchange value, as our mental contents constraint requires. One way in which this 
aboutness can be understood is as a propositional attitude. 
By focusing on the propositional attitude required for money rather than on collective 
intentionality as the axis of disagreement, we find that the sides of the debate have changed. On 
one side is Guala, unable to capture social objects that are subject to a mental contents constraint, 
and on the other are Searle and Smit et al., whose views accommodate social objects which 
depend on propositional attitudes with specific contents. 
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2015) also uses propositional attitudes to categorize social 
kinds. He divides them into groups depending on the extent to which they require propositional 
attitudes for their existence. Like Khalidi, we rely on propositional attitudes; however, we are 
focusing on propositional attitudes of a different sort, and this difference is important. 6 When 
Khalidi discusses the propositional attitudes on which social objects might depend, he means, 
quite precisely, propositional attitudes about those social objects themselves. Khalidi is 
interested in the question of whether social kinds like racism, war, money, and prime minister 
depend for their existence on people having attitudes toward those very social kinds themselves.  
Khalidi (2015) even defines the term “attitudes” in his paper “to stand in for propositional 
attitudes or mental states that explicitly represent the kinds in question.” (p. 98) 
                                                             
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for help in clarifying this point. 
6 This does not mean we disagree with Khalidi’s classification of money. Khalidi (2015) classifies money as a 
distinctive social kind, whose existence depends on at least some members of a group having attitudes toward the 
type ‘money,’ but which does not require that those attitudes be held toward every token of that type, in order to 
make them an instance of that kind. Our mental contents constraint neither includes nor excludes Khalidi’s account 
of money. Khalidi’s account of money requires attitudes directed toward the type ‘money,’ while our constraint 
requires specific attitudes in every instance of money. They are in principle compatible, and together might 
constitute jointly necessary conditions on money. 
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Khalidi’s view reveals a kind of representationalism, one that insists at least some social 
kinds, institutions, or other social objects depend on attitudes about those kinds, institutions, or 
objects in order to exist. It is this representationalism which Guala (2015) denies when he claims 
money “does not depend on the representations of some things as money.” (p. 9) The debate 
regarding the role that propositional attitudes play in institutions has so far been focused on the 
propositional attitudes about those institutions themselves.7 We propose a shift of focus, to a 
propositional attitude with a different kind of content. In the case of money, the relevant attitudes 
are not those directed at the kind or institution ‘money’ itself, but rather those directed toward 
the objects in the exchange.  If the exchange is sufficiently about exchange value, it will count as 
a monetary transaction.  
Money therefore depends on attitudes for its existence, but not on attitudes regarding the 
institution of money itself, with which the debates over collective intentionality and 
propositional attitudes have usually been concerned. Social objects that depend on a 
propositional attitude in the way money depends on attitudes toward exchange will thwart any 
purely functional attempts to capture them. The mental contents constraint introduced here both 
divides the debate on the social ontology of institutions in a different way, placing authors 
traditionally understood as opponents on the same side as allies, and shows that there is another, 
                                                             
7 A recent exchange between Searle (2015) and Hindriks and Guala (2015) in the Journal of Institutional Economics 
covered a variety of issues, but also included a disagreement over the importance of what Hindriks and Guala call 
“the very human capacity to represent rules.” (2015, p. 517) Searle insists a rule cannot possibly be normative 
without the humans representing the rule to themselves as authoritative, while Hinkriks and Guala claim a rule can 
be normative without such explicit representation. This debate is also about propositional attitudes directed at social 
objects themselves, because it is essentially about whether a rule must be explicitly recognized as having its status in 
order to be normative (which is to say it depends on some attitudes directed toward it in order to exist) or if a rule 
can be normative without such explicit recognition (which is to say it does not depend on the attitudes directed 
toward it). 
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importantly different, way in which a social object can depend on a propositional attitude to 
exist, a way that has so far been underappreciated in the debate.8 
 
8. Conclusion 
The mental contents constraint introduces one necessary requirement for any adequate 
account of money, and demonstrates a previously underappreciated way in which a social object 
can depend on a propositional attitude. As far as accounts of money go, whether or not one 
considers Smit et al.’s account of money as an improvement over Searle’s will, of course, depend 
also on one’s other ontological and methodological commitments. Relative to our mental 
contents constraint alone, both Searle and Smit et al.’s accounts of money succeed, but we do not 
here assert that meeting this single necessary condition is sufficient to vindicate either their 
accounts of money specifically or of social reality more generally. Indeed, someone might find 
both accounts to involve too many unacceptable ontological commitments to endorse. As far as 
this paper is concerned, we have no quarrel with anyone wishing to discard the accounts of 
Searle, Smit et al., and any other account which includes intentional mental contents in the 
world. 
We would object if that person declined those ontological commitments and yet went on 
to assert that while the world has no mental contents, it nevertheless has money. As we have 
argued in this paper, that can’t be, because money is about exchange value, and no one who 
discards this aboutness can capture money. 
                                                             
8 We are not the first to notice that social objects can depend on propositional attitudes this way. Thomasson (2003) 
asserts and Khalidi (2015) agrees that social kinds like racism, inflation, recession, and poverty all depend on some 
propositional attitudes to exist, but not on attitudes about those kinds themselves. Thomasson and Khalidi both 
notice that this sort of social object is possible, but do not make any larger use of this fact. 
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Here, we have objected to Francesco Guala’s recent attempts to explain money without 
accounting for the intentional mental contents of the agents using it. We argue that in doing so, 
Guala gives an inadequate account of money. This is not to say either that Guala’s account of 
money is beyond repair, or that money must be the model for all social reality. The details of the 
social object in question will determine whether it is also subject to a mental contents constraint 
in the way that money is. Guala (2016) himself discusses other institutions like marriage and 
private property. If those social kinds are found to also depend in the same way on the mental 
contents of the agents creating them, then Guala’s attempts to capture them in terms of pure 
function will also fall short. Perhaps these institutions do depend on mental contents in the way 
money does (perhaps marriage has to be about love and private property about greed), but 
settling those questions are projects involving the large and sophisticated literatures on them, and 
well beyond the scope of this paper.  
Within its scope has been an investigation of three prominent accounts of institutional 
reality through their ability to capture distinctively monetary phenomena. Because money is a 
matter of transactions, rather than mere exchanges, accounts like Searle’s and Smit et al.’s can 
capture it because they can capture the mental contents in which money partially consists. By 
contrast, Guala’s current model of social reality cannot capture any social object like money that 
requires not only that creatures with minds bring it into existence, but that those minds hold 
specific attitudes toward it in order to make it what it distinctively is. 
Whether this ultimately makes money real or imaginary, factual or fictitious, remains to 
be seen, and requires further argument. We do, however, hope to have made some progress 
toward answering these questions by showing in this paper that, wherever money fits in the 
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world, it must be in the same category as mental contents, because it cannot be what it is without 
them. 
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